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Abstract
Organisations play key roles within our society.  They have the responsibility for managing,
maintaining and operating our infrastructure, creating our economy, and providing employment
and essential goods and services for our communities.  An organisationÕs ability to respond
effectively to adverse events depends on their structure, the management and operational
systems they have in place, and the collective resilience of these.
New Zealand organisations have been through considerable structural change over the past
two decades.  This has occurred at all levels from central through to local government and the
private sector.  Some organisations have in fact been through several cycles of restructuring in
the pursuit of different philosophies.  This process has seen the evolution into smaller and
more independent organisations and business units.  Their focus on short-term economic
efficiency has however had a detrimental effect in terms of planning to be resilient in the face
of major emergency events.
This paper provides a past/ present/ future perspective of New Zealand by presenting reflec-
tions on the impacts of corporatisation during the Ô80s and Ô90s, a view of the current situation
and suggestions on where future emphasis should be placed.  The view is expressed that
relatively few organisations (public or private) in New Zealand are currently making appropriate
levels of commitment and investment in the vital element of ÔreadinessÕ or preparedness to
respond to and recover from major emergency events.  In addition to highlighting the challenge
that this situation represents, some practical strategies for increasing organisational resilience
are suggested, along with key areas where greater resource commitment should be made.
Introduction
Organisations play key roles within our society.  They have the responsibility for managing,
maintaining and operating our infrastructure, running our economy, and providing employment
and essential goods and services for our communities.  The ability of an organisation to
respond effectively to adverse events depends on their structure, the management and opera-
tional systems they have in place, and the collective resilience of these.
The ability of key organisations to continue to function in the face of unexpected events will
have a large influence on the length of time that essential services are unavailable, and on the
duration of recovery for the community as a whole. There is a need therefore to be able to
critically evaluate the consequences that hazard events may have on organisations.
New Zealand organisations have been through considerable structural change over the past
two decades.  This has occurred at all levels from central through to local government and the
private sector.  Some organisations have in fact been through several cycles of restructuring in
the pursuit of different philosophies.  This process has seen the evolution into smaller and
more independent organisations and business units.  Their focus on short-term economic
efficiency has however had a detrimental effect in terms of planning to be resilient in the face
of major emergency events.
Recent flood events and multi-agency simulation exercises have highlighted specific organisa-
tional challenges to be addressed in order to maintain a sustainable response to major emer-
gencies.
The Concept of Organisational Resilience
To understand the impact of hazard events, we need to evaluate how key organisations are
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going to perform during and after these events.  This requires not only understanding the
degree to which they might be impacted, but also their capability for responding and recover-
ing from these impacts.  This requires understanding the ÔresilienceÕ of organisations.
What does it mean to be a resilient organisation?  Resilience definitions refer to the ability of
a material or system to absorb change gracefully whilst retaining core properties or functions:
Resilience:
¥ the ability to rebound to original shape/form after deformation that does not exceed its
elastic limit;
¥ the ability of a system to recover easily and quickly from adversity.
Resilience may be broken down into two key components: vulnerability and adaptive capacity.
These components are illustrated in Figure 1.  In the centre of the diagram the shock represents
an event that pushes an individual, community or an organisation from one state of relative
stability or equilibrium into another.  The ease with which an organisation is pushed into this
new state is a measure of their vulnerability, while the degree to which they are able to cope
with that change is a measure of their adaptive capacity (Dalziell and McManus, 2004).  The
resilience of the organisation is a function of the area under the curve, relating to both the
magnitude of impacts experienced by the organisation and the time it takes for that organisa-
tion to recover.
Figure 1: Severity and duration of impact on KPIs as a measure of system resilience, where
resilience is a function of the area under the curve.
This generic framework highlights several opportunities for improving an organisationÕs resil-
ience:
1 Reducing the likelihood that recoverable limits will be exceeded (risk management).
2 Moving the boundaries which define the recoverable limits for the organisation (business
continuity planning).
3 Reducing the response time to recognise that change or action is needed (situational
awareness).
4 Improving the speed and capability of the organisation for responding to change (creativity
and responsiveness).
Resilience Management brings together existing risk management and business continuity
planning into a common framework; combining a strategy of managing identified risks with an
ability to respond effectively when a crisis actually happens; irrespective of whether or not that
event has been previously identified as a risk.
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How to Evaluate Resilience?
A significant challenge to evaluating the resilience of organisations is the complexity of organi-
sations, and the ever-changing context within which they operate.  This is the subject of a six
year research project underway in New Zealand (Resilient Organisations, 2005).  The research
explores:
¥ The decision-making context of risk management and business continuity planning within
organisations;
¥ Their ethos towards preparing for extreme events;
¥ An organisationÕs potential to be adaptive and even prosperous in crisis situations;
¥ Perceptions within organisations around their levels of manageability and control over
unexpected events;
¥ The criticality and resilience of inter-organisational relationships and how these are man-
aged by organisations;
¥ The role of an organisation in the wider community, and how expectations of performance
after a major event align with those of the wider community.
The research includes ten in-depth case studies of different organisations to evaluate their
resilience to unexpected events.  An early challenge identified was the need to get organisa-
tions thinking beyond the typical ÔdisasterÕ scenarios.  In New Zealand, quite understandably,
focus tends to concentrate on natural hazards such as flooding or earthquakes.  The research
uses four consequence scenarios to encourage organisations to explore different aspects of
their resilience.  These consequence scenarios are:
¥ Regional Event:  Significant physical damage to buildings, contents, and resources, coupled
with severe disruptions to lifeline services such as transportation, electricity, water and
telecommunications.  An example of this type of event may be a major earthquake or flood.
¥ Societal Event:  A nationwide event resulting in extended staffing absences.  In this event
all physical infrastructure is intact, but staff are either unable or unwilling to be at work.
Examples may be an influenza or SARS pandemic.
¥ Localised Event:  An organisation specific incident resulting in loss of life, severe disruption
to normal operations and reputation impacts.  The intense focus of media and regulatory
agencies requires the organisation to focus on managing stakeholder perception as well as
the physical response and recovery from the event.  Examples may be a fire or explosion in
a key building, or a hazardous spill affecting the immediate locality.
¥ Distal Event:  Impacts business flow through key suppliers or customers.  This consequence
scenario is designed to explore the ways an organisation may be impacted through its
networks of inter-organisational relationships.  Examples may be failure of a key supplier,
major disaster of another large urban centre, or an international shortage of key resources.
Knowing that organisations are an important component towards creating more resilient com-
munities is one thing; effecting change to encourage organisations to increase their resilience
is another.  Creating a compelling business case for investing in greater resilience is inherently
difficult when the return period of the event is significantly longer than the planning horizon of
the organisation.  Key requirements towards achieving more resilient organisations are:
¥ The development of simple yet effective frameworks that organisations can use to evaluate
their resilience.
¥ A common language and terminology to enable dialogue and debate within organisations
about their resilience priorities, and to facilitate communication between organisations
about common issues and interdependencies in their resilience strategies.
¥ Metrics for evaluating and benchmarking resilience.  Metrics are needed so that organisa-
tions can demonstrate and value their resilience strategies, and create a business case for
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improving resilience.  These metrics must be both meaningful to decision makers within
organisations, and directly relevant to the overall goals and objectives of the organisation.
¥ The sharing of case studies and lessons learnt to raise awareness of the need for, and
demonstrate best practice in, Resilience Management.
The Current Nature of Organisations in New Zealand
Organisations across most sectors in New Zealand today can best be characterised as being
more independent than in previous decades, with a greater number of organisations in any
given sector.  This broad characterisation typically encompasses business units within local
authorities and central government agencies as well as private companies.  This profile is also
considered to reasonably well represent most western countries.
This context derives from two decades of restructuring in the quest for economic accountability
and independence.  The focus across both the public and private sectors has been to produce
smaller business units with an emphasis on autonomy and self-reliance in order to produce
economically efficient organisations and competitive sectors.
Issues and Implications for Resilience
This modern organisational environment has potentially significant implications for organisa-
tional resilience, particularly in terms of preparing for and responding to adverse situations.
These could be rapidly occurring events such as earthquake, sabotage or biosecurity breach, or
unfolding events such as a pandemic.
The emphasis on larger numbers of functionally independent organisations has essentially
produced a large number of ÔsilosÕ Ð units that whilst they may be economically efficient in the
day-to-day operating context, typically lack sufficient connectivity and critical mass to enable a
co-ordinated and collective response to adverse events.
This inherent vulnerability can be offset by a conscious effort to actively link across the indi-
vidual elements Ð but there are few signs of this in evidence in many sectors.  Conversely,
some organisations within critical infrastructure sectors such as energy and telecommunica-
tions have been reluctant to plan collectively for emergency events lest this be seen as collud-
ing in terms of their governing legislation.  This misplaced anxiety has hindered a much-
needed collaborative approach.
Some of the key issues and the corresponding implications are discussed below.
(1) Loss of strategic level operational experience, system knowledge, and central technical
expertise and resources
There has been a progressive loss of strategic and operational experience through the restruc-
turing process, including significant amounts of system knowledge.  In the infrastructure sec-
tors, this further reduces the institutional ability to recognise the onset of multi-system failure
situations, particularly when compounded with ageing physical infrastructure in some utility
sectors.
The disestablishment of the Ministry of Works and Development (MWD) in the late-1980s
brought to an end the central capability for high-level independent strategic technical advice
on infrastructure and built environment issues to Government.  In addition to strategic plan-
ning advice on energy issues in conjunction with the then NZ Electricity Department, MWD
provided significant input into the development of design standards across the range of infra-
structure and built environment categories.  As the GovernmentÕs technical arm, MWD also
placed emphasis on key public facilities being designed to meet functional and operating
requirements which in many cases went beyond minimum regulatory requirements.
The physical works arm of MWD also provided a central plant and workforce resource capacity,
which although less economically efficient on a day-to-day basis, would prove invaluable in
times of major disaster.  No equivalent central capability or arrangements currently exist.
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At local government level, there has been a significant movement of utility asset managers into
the consulting arena.  While this has added to the loss of in-house technical knowledge, some
of the positives include the ability to apply that knowledge to a range of other organisations.
General staff turnover also contributes to a loss of operational knowledge.  One of the obser-
vations made in the lead up to the recent Foot and Mouth Disease simulation organised by the
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was that of the more than a dozen government agencies
involved in an exotic disease response, less than 20% of the relevant people had been in-
volved in the last such exercise held only two and a half years previously.
(2) Contractors as the critical delivery arm for response and recovery
The associated trend to reduce the direct staff base of organisations has seen the outsourcing
of many functions that are not deemed to be ÔcoreÕ functions.  This has resulted in a heavy (and
in some cases, total) dependency upon external contractors to deliver key functions.  Examples
range from facility security, communications services database management and inspections
(eg. AgriQuality for MAF) through to the full service delivery functions for some lifeline utility
asset managers (including professional technical services as a separately contracted element).
Despite the criticality of many of these functions to the principal, asset manager or community,
it is observed that inadequate attention is typically given to the likely effectiveness of the
response to major emergencies by contracting agencies.  This requires consideration of how
the functional relationships would operate in adverse circumstances, rather than just focusing
on the actual contract requirements themselves.  In turn, this requires a time investment by
both the principal and the contractor.
Documents defining these relationships need to spell out both the expectations and specific
performance/ delivery requirements for contractors in such situations.  As well as considering
major natural hazard events which directly and physically affect wide sections of the commu-
nity, these expectations and requirements need to cover the aspects of a response which
involves the principal as lead agent (eg. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry for biosecurity and
Ministry of Health and District Health Boards for pandemic).
(3) Leadership and accountability across the public/ private interface
Two utility failures of quite different scales highlight the lingering expectations by the general
public of technical leadership and co-ordination from ÔCity HallÕ.
In the 1998 Auckland CBD power crisis, there was disappointment in some circles regarding the
lack of technical leadership that Auckland City Council could provide to the response process
(Newlove et al, 2003).  With the ownership of the assets (and hence the technical problem)
sitting with the then Mercury Energy, Auckland City Council personnel had difficulties in identi-
fying and locating the basic data they needed in order to make informed decisions about the
management of the Auckland City CBD.  This in turn meant that the Mayor of Auckland City was
widely perceived as being powerless in this situation Ð wholly understandable in terms of the
devolved ownership arrangements, but of little consolation to the business community and the
many others affected.
A subsequent major gas leak in Wellington City in 2000 also highlighted the lack of specific
responsibility for utility co-ordination in local incidents.  It took four hours after a significant
gas leak was first noticed to establish which of the two distribution companies actually owned
the ruptured main.  Amongst other things, this highlighted that no single agency has responsi-
bility for co-ordinating utility response for this level of incident.  If the same incident had
occurred ten years previously, co-ordination would have been provided by the City Council
from ÔCity HallÕ Ð as at that point in time, Council was the owner and operator of energy supply
assets as well as water and wastewater services.
The key point from both of these examples is that while the public understands at a conceptual
level the modern forms of asset ownership and the associated day-to-day operating implica-
tions, the ultimate accountability for managing the response will philosophically remain with
elected members of local and central government.
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The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (CDEM Act, 2002) provides an appropriate bal-
ance in this regard Ð while the Act frames the duties and expectations of lifeline utilities, local
government (via CDEM Groups) and central government (via the Ministry of Civil Defence &
Emergency Management) have a responsibility to encourage and monitor the engagement of
lifeline utilities in terms of risk reduction and response readiness.
Moving Forward Ð Focusing on Readiness
The Resilient Organisations research programme represents a longer term strategy for improv-
ing the resilience of New Zealand organisations.  But what can be done right now to address
the resilience issues of our key organisations with specific response roles?
Recent flood events, along with recent multi-agency exercises and the early case studies that
are the subject of the Resilient Organisations research programme, have highlighted that greater
levels of effort need to be put into Readiness (or preparedness) measures by agencies with
designated response roles.
Priority areas that could form the basis of organisational action plans to enhance the readiness
aspect of the resilience of organisations are outlined below.
Comprehensive Resource Planning
Specific planning is required for adequate levels of appropriately skilled and trained response
personnel (comprising technical and support; in-house, contract, other agencies) to enable a
sustained (ÔcampaignÕ) response.
Agency emergency response planning has commonly tended to focus on only those parts of
organisations with Ôfront lineÕ response obligations.  The reality is that the full depth of most
organisations will be called upon in the event of a major emergency event, requiring the
mobilisation of general support staff to enable a 24/7 operation to be sustained in the crucial
early stages of a response.  ÔSupport staffÕ in this context includes a range of knowledgeable
and experienced people who donÕt necessarily appreciate the valuable contribution that they
would make in an adverse situation, and are not specifically trained to operate in that mode.
This is particularly the case in some government agencies.
Sharing Resourcing, Knowledge & Experience Across Silos
Organisations and sectors need to drive their own risk-based response arrangements and
capability development.  But as the preceding points have illustrated, the key aspect that is
missing relates to linking the efforts across individual organisations and sectors, particularly
with regard to the sharing of resourcing, knowledge and experience. Much greater emphasis
should be given to the inputs that could/ should be provided by other supporting agencies
(both for specific roles and general resource assistance).
Within the public sector, Government needs to consider fostering the transportability of readi-
ness and response planning skills amongst key departments and agencies.  There also needs
to be a more comprehensive process by which to apply response lessons from one organisa-
tion or sector to another.  This should include more active encouragement for sharing of
response resources, both actively during planning and preparation and in response situations.
Understanding the Processes for the Delivery of Contracted Services in an Emergency
In many situations involving the delivery of critical functions by contractors, there is a need for
specific dialogue and definition around expectations and responsibilities by both parties to
extreme events.
Readiness in this context should see contractors demonstrate their ability to perform their core
contracted function on which the principal depends, as opposed to dependence upon broad
ÔmotherhoodÕ or Ôbest endeavoursÕ contract clauses.  It is important that this ability to perform
be demonstrated via a constructive and dynamic engagement rather than simply as a static
audit process.  Whilst the contractual ÔstickÕ will no doubt need to be wielded in some cases in
order to obtain the time commitment of the involvement of a contracting organisation, the
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spirit of a ÔcarrotÕ should be used in order for both sides to constructively understand how they
will deliver their respective functions in an adverse event.
How Much Effort is Required?
Disasters can wipe out literally years of economic progress in small economies (whether viewed
organisationally, regionally or nationally).  Enhancing resilience for organisations and from a
national perspective therefore has the aspect of minimising the extent of unforeseen losses,
and needs to be justified in this context.
Two key questions for New Zealand around the Ôlevel of effortÕ topic and readiness include:
¥ What form and extent of training and skills maintenance is appropriate for Ôlow probability
but high impactÕ events across the range of organisations?
¥ What is an appropriate level of investment?  Should there be more of a direct link between
the level of investment from year to year and the overall estimated cost for extreme events
(to an individual organisation and to the country)?  Could this be expressed as a percentage
of the possible (foreseeable) economic impact where it is possible to cost the impacts of
representative or maximum credible events?
It is the view of the authors that a national level discussion should be held around these
questions, which apply across a range of agencies and sectors.
Concluding Observations
In this paper we have covered the past, the present and outlined some thoughts for making
progress in the future.  The point that we have tried to make is that the key to generating more
resilient organisations is to put in more focused efforts in the future than we have in the past.
TodayÕs organisational environment features larger numbers of functionally independent or-
ganisations than in the past.  The resulting focus of the business unit ÔsilosÕ on short-term
economic efficiency has had a detrimental effect in terms of planning to be resilient in the face
of major emergency events.  Efficient and effective response and recovery processes require
integration across organisational units and between agencies.  This integration is achievable,
but requires an increase in the level of organisational effort in terms of specific planning and
resource commitment commensurate with the increasing numbers of organisational units in-
volved.
Conceptually, the solutions for capability building to overcome this inherent vulnerability are
relatively straightforward.  However the first step, that of commitment, is proving elusive.  It
could be said that we are suffering from Ôone silo too manyÕ.  In many sectors, the levels of
awareness, planning and investment for events outside of the Ônormal envelopeÕ do not appear
to have increased to offset these fundamental structural changes.  There is now a need to play
ÔcatchupÕ given all of the structural changes that have occurred over the past two decades.
The real issue for many organisations seems to be a lack of understanding of the full scope of
response, including the expectations of other agencies, and extending right out to community
level.  Once the scope and scale of a potential response is mapped out, the necessary extent
of readiness activities and hence the level of commitment required becomes reasonably appar-
ent.
Work in these areas will require some quite fundamental shifts in organisational commitment,
both within and across organisational (and in many cases, contract) boundaries Ð and in both
the public and private sectors.
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